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Abstract 
Purpose: The paper draws on the naturalistic decision making (NDM) and cognitive science literature 
to examine how experienced crisis managers utilize the intuitive and analytical strategies when 
managing complex incidents. A cognitive model that describes the interplay between strategies is 
presented and discussed, and the specific role that intuition plays in analytical decision making is 
addressed.  
Design/methodology/approach: Designed as a conceptual paper, the extant literature is reviewed to 
advance discussion on the theme of intuitive and analytical decision making in the naturalistic 
environment. A new model of expert intuition is presented and evaluated against existing cognitive 
models from the wider literature.   
Findings:  The paper suggests that experts’ ability to make intuitive decisions is strongly hinged on 
their information processing skills that allow irrelevant cues to be sifted out while the relevant cues 
are retained. The paper further revealed that experts generally employ the intuitive mode as their 
default strategy, drawing on the analytical mode only as conditions warrant.  
Originality/value: Prior research has shown that experts often make important task decisions using 
intuitive or analytical strategies or by combining both, but the sequence these should typically follow 
is still unresolved. Findings from the intuition model reveal that although intuition often precedes 
analytical thinking in almost all cases, both strategies exist to offer significant values to decision 
makers if the basis of their application is well understood.  
Keywords: Intuition, intuitive judgment, experts, decision making, crisis management, information 
processing  
Introduction  
The traditional (classical) decision making theory dominated common understanding of how experts 
make decisions for decades. It assumes that people have unfailing memory and possess large 
computational abilities required to run complex decision calculations (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994; Scott, 
2000; Bonabeau, 2003). Similar to the concept of unbounded rationality the theory suggests that 
people are generally exposed to a great deal of information which allows them make the ‘best’ 
decision. It is also assumes that decision makers are aware of most, if not all, available choice options 
alongside their potential impacts. The common prescription by the rational choice theorists is that 
professionals should avoid making intuitive decisions wherever possible and instead think more 
deliberately. However, with the emergence of a body of knowledge known as naturalistic decision 
making (NDM) in the early 80’s, researchers began to re-conceptualize the subject of expert decision 
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making across a range of domains (Zsambok, 1997; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Salas, Rosen, & 
DiazGranados, 2012; Kermarrec and Bossard, 2014; Klein, 2015; Gore and Conway, 2016). 
Consequently, these studies began to identify inherent flaws in some of the assumptions underpinning 
the rational choice theory. Firstly, the views of ‘rationality’ and ‘optimality’ were criticized for being 
unrealistic in real-life crisis environments as prior evidence consistently demonstrated the difficulty in 
maintaining an open mind, particularly when officers have very limited thinking time for which to 
make high stake decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman, 2003; Dunning et al., 2003; 
Tsoukas, 2003; Klein, 2003 p.21; Waroquier et al., 2010). The prediction here is that operators are 
always likely to tweak the decision criteria, albeit unconsciously, to fit their pre-conceived and pre-
determined notions. Secondly, the fact that in recent years crisis environments have become 
increasingly fast paced and relatively more dynamic than previously assumed has meant that it 
appeared unlikely that people would have the time to make complex calculations that evaluated 
different options (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005; Ingham, 2007; Salas et al., 
2012; Sadler-smith, 2016).   
Although prior evidence suggests that decision making involves more than one reasoning strategy, at 
least in practice i.e. the intuitive and analytical approaches, the debate regarding the dominant 
thinking mode and the preferred sequence these should follow has continued to garner strength in 
the current literature (Dane and Pratt, 2009; Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Evans and Over 2009; Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009; Hoffrage and Marewski, 2015; Okoli et al., 2016a; Gore and Conman, 2016). Should 
people first draw on their intuition before engaging in analysis or is it the other way round? In what 
ways do the task environment influence the choice of a dominant thinking strategy at any given time?  
In addressing these issues, the current paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the paper begins with 
contextualizing and conceptualizing intuition from a naturalistic decision-making perspective: a body 
of knowledge concerned with understanding how operators make decisions when performing real 
tasks using their experience. Intuition is then discussed as a scientific concept, exploring and 
synthesizing a range of existing theoretical models in relation to the subject. Next, the relationship 
between intuition, intuitive judgment and expertise is discussed, including how expert intuition differs 
from that of novices. Finally, a cognitive model developed from a recent study with expert firefighters 
── the information filtering and intuitive decision-making model ── is introduced and evaluated 
against other notable intuitive models in the wider literature. The IFIDM captures and articulates some 
of the nuances and connections that exist between the analytical and intuitive constructs from a 
naturalistic viewpoint. The model examines, in particular, the role of intuition in the so called analytical 
thought process. By exploring and synthesising a wide range of literature in naturalistic decision 
making, cognitive science, management learning, and decision psychology, the current paper is aimed 
at expanding existing debates around intuitive and analytical thought processes and examining how 
both constructs interact when performing high staked tasks under time pressure. Detailed 
methodological discourse, including the expert qualitative reports that aided the development of the 
IFIDM model has been covered elsewhere in the first output of an ongoing series (See Okoli et al., 
2016a for details) and will therefore not be discussed in this conceptual paper. For reference purposes, 
however, a brief summary of key methodological insights is presented later.  
The concept of intuition 
It is no longer new that the modern society has been taught to mistrust intuition, preferring instead 
explicitly articulated expressions, theoretical or codified knowledge (Lamond and Thompson, 2000; 
Hodgkinson et al., 2009). The early work of Albert Einstein voiced a criticism of society’s quest for 
excessive deliberation at the expense of intuition. In his words:   
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“The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have 
created a society that honours the servant and has forgotten the gift” (Albert Einstein, 1879–
1955 cited in Klein, 2003, p.3).  
The application of intuitive knowledge has undoubtedly generated a great deal of controversy in the 
scientific literature, perhaps unsurprisingly, since intuition operates in the sub-conscious and deals 
with tacitly held knowledge that is difficult to verbalize and articulate. There is also widespread belief 
that intuition and intuitive judgement may promote cognitive biases and heuristics, which in turn 
distort rational thinking (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Meehl, 1986; Kahneman, 2003; Dana and 
Dawes, 2004; Evans and Over, 2010).  
Intuition has been studied from diverse perspectives, what Redekop (2009) broadly categorised into 
“cultivated” and “hard-wired” dimensions, each with equally compelling evidence. For the purpose of 
clarity, however, the epistemology of the current paper is underpinned by the former dimension. We 
build on Klein’s (2003) definition of intuition as the act of translating one’s experience into action, a 
definition consistent with the assumption that every individual is embedded, either consciously or 
unconsciously, in a continuous flow of experience throughout their lifetime.  Thankfully, the scientific 
measurement of intuition and how it can be taught continues to burgeon with the emergence of new 
tools and frameworks that have successfully modelled intuition as a valid form of knowledge across 
disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science, business and management, education, sports, 
healthcare and even engineering (Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2005; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Hodgkinson et 
al., 2009; Kermarrec and Bossard, 2014; Klein 2015; Gore and Conway, 2016; Okoli et al., 2016a). 
According to Dane and Pratt (2009) intuition represents ‘affectively charged judgments that arise 
through rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations’, while Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) viewed 
it as a non-sequential information processing mode that comprises both cognitive and affective 
elements and results in direct (tacit) knowing. Regardless of how it is defined, a general consensus is 
that intuitive judgment incurs little or no information processing costs and enables individuals to 
quickly integrate multiple reasons into their decisions with little mental energy (Hoffrage and 
Marewski, 2015). Essentially, making intuitive decisions involves integrating and processing 
information rapidly, which often results in direct ‘knowing without knowing how’ ── implicit learning. 
In other words, people learn on daily basis without knowing when, how or where such learning took 
place yet applying what was learnt to solve future problems in clearly novel ways.  
One of the ways to describe the modus operandus of intuition is to think of it as an advanced pattern 
recognition mechanism where the subconscious mind somehow finds a link between a current 
problem and the various patterns that had been stored in memory e.g. from past experiences. The 
sub-conscious mind then rapidly projects the new problem onto pre-stored patterns and sends a 
‘message of wisdom’ to the decision maker. This message comes as an inner voice and is frequently 
expressed in the language of one’s feelings, in the form of calmness or relief, or as a burst of 
enthusiasm and energy, although this generally works differently for every operator (Khatri and Ng, 
2000)  
Therefore, whilst intuition could potentially betray a decision-maker, successful leaders hardly ignore 
their instincts ── albeit with a clearer sense of when (or not) to trust it. Evidence from experimental 
studies also show that subjects who frequently ignored their intuition subsequently made poorer 
decisions compared to their counterparts (Johnson and Raab, 2003; Waroquier et al. 2010).   
Intuition, intuitive judgement and expertise 
 
 
4 
 
Not all intuitive judgment come from skills, and although incorrect intuitions just like the valid ones 
tend to arise from the operations of memory, the mechanisms that produce the former only operate 
in the absence of skills (Dunning et al., 2003; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Evans and Over, 2010). The difficulty 
is that people have no clear-cut way of knowing where their intuition comes from, neither is there any 
objective marker that distinguishes correct intuition from those produced by highly imperfect 
heuristics. Hence, attempts to differentiate between expert intuition and other forms of intuition have 
been well documented in the literature (King and Clark, 2002; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010; Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2012). This is based on 
the notion that the former is extensively rooted in domain-specific knowledge acquired through 
considerable years of consistent and deliberate practice.  
King and Clark (2002) investigated how nurses across four levels of expertise (advanced beginners, 
competent, proficient and expert levels) made use of their intuition to perform a range of domain 
specific tasks. The decision points identified in the study revealed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that nurses 
across all levels of expertise solved difficult problems using both intuitive and analytical styles. Further 
analysis, however, showed that the frequency with which intuitive decisions were made and the level 
of confidence associated with intuiting increased progressively with expertise. This outcome was 
similarly echoed by Baylor (2001) in her U-shaped model. Baylor noted that although both novice and 
expert operators generally understood what intuition and intuitive decisions entailed, the former 
tended to display less confidence in the way they recalled and implemented their intuitive knowledge 
── something she termed immature intuition.   
The type of expert intuition described in this paper extends beyond the knowledge type that emerges 
from mere simplification of thoughts, rather it refers to a form of tacit knowledge that is developed 
through years of dedication, hard work, consistent and deliberate practice. For example, studies on 
chess (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973) suggest that at least 10,000 hours of dedicated practice is required 
to attain the highest level of performance (which is equivalent to playing chess five hours a day for 
about 6 years). The more patterns people acquire over their years of active practice the more the 
possibility of them matching a new situation to one of the pre-stored patterns. This is the principle 
that helps experts to recognize, almost instantaneously, the possible cause of a fire just by looking at 
the smoke colour or flame texture. The main doctrine of the NDM community across domains of 
sports, medicine and midwifery, education, aviation, military, ambulance and firefighting is that 
intuition results from experience which in turn produces experts (Zsambok, 1997; Tissington and Flin, 
2005; Klein et al., 2010; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010; Okoli et al., 2014; Kermarrec and Bossard, 
2014; Hoffrage and Marewski, 2015). Experienced commanders rely on their rich domain knowledge 
to describe, explain and predict events better. As it becomes obvious that generating and evaluating 
large sets of options would likely cause an incident to grow out of control, expert commanders tend 
to leverage on their experience to generate a workable option, which is usually the first and possibly 
the only option they might consider. The quality of people’s intuition is therefore only as good as the 
experience(s) upon which it was built.   
There is little doubt that performance could be improved if conditions allowed sufficient processing 
time or provided decision makers with all the relevant information when needed, but this is rarely the 
case in a crisis environment typically characterized by uncertainty, time pressure, ambiguity, 
continuously changing conditions and ill-defined goals ── all of which necessitates the making of swift 
and rapid decisions. And whilst having sound domain knowledge about the cognitive rules associated 
with various tasks may be a good starting point, this could subsequently prove insufficient if an officer 
is unable to act intuitively and decisively under extreme conditions. We therefore argue that in 
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addition to building a repertoire of technical skills, crisis responders must also give equal, if not more, 
attention to developing their intuitive skills. 
Some philosophical and theoretical perspectives of intuition as a scientific construct 
Michael Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher, was the first to use the term tacit knowledge ― a term 
that has now become popular in the knowledge management literature (Tsoukas, 2003). In discussing 
the dichotomy between intuitive and theoretical (codified) knowledge, Polanyi’s philosophy is largely 
based on the doctrine that intuition is often the dominant form of knowledge, and that what is 
generally referred to as rationality (or objectivity) is largely underpinned by personal knowing. His 
main line of thought is that creative acts (or acts of discovery) are imbued with strong personal feelings 
and commitments, and that knowledge is highly dependent on human action. He refuted the then 
dominant belief that science was value-free, arguing instead that the informed guesses, gut-feelings 
and intuitions which are part of exploratory acts are motivated by ‘passions’. The assumption that 
theoretical knowledge is totally objective was the major bone of contention for Polanyi, who argued 
instead that all forms of knowing are personal (Polanyi, 1966). A closer look at how the so called 
codified knowledge is used in practice reveals it is grounded on personal judgments and tacit 
commitments, implying therefore that theoretical or codified knowledge is not as objective, explicit, 
or self-sustaining as it was assumed. All forms of knowledge contain what Polanyi (1962, p.17) termed 
personal coefficient or intuitive knowledge, exactly what makes the interpretation of facts and 
application of knowledge unique from one individual to another — since individuals acquire and utilize 
skills in unique ways.  
Another theoretical framework that has been widely referenced in the NDM literature is the 
recognition primed decision making model (RPDM), originally developed by Gary Klein and his 
colleagues (Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). Recognition primed decisions, according to 
this model, are decisions for which actions are directly derived from recognition of critical information 
(cues) and prior experiential knowledge. The initial study that led to the development of this model 
stemmed from an attempt to describe and analyse the decision making strategies used by fireground 
commanders who were required to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and time pressure. 
The authors’ initial hypothesis was that the commanders would restrict their analysis to only a pair of 
options, but contrary to pre-conceived beliefs all that the commanders generated was a single choice 
option without the need to compare several alternatives. This was possible because the officers could 
draw upon the repertoire of patterns (a collection of cues that has been chunked in memory) which 
had been compiled over more than a decade of experience to identify a plausible option that was 
considered first. Simply put, the RPD model describes how recognized patterns could be efficiently 
used to solve current problems. One of the key insights from the RPD model is that intuition has a 
higher capacity than analysis, not necessarily because the latter is in itself a wrong thing to do but 
because too much deliberation tends to disrupt the naturally flowing first impressions that support 
intuition. 
Subsequently, the recognition/metacognitive (R/M) model was developed by Cohen et al. (1996) to 
describe how naval officers made critical decisions in novel and largely unpredictable circumstances. 
Whereas the RPD model assumes that proficient decision makers will often rely on recognized 
patterns to solve a current task, the R/M model identified a possible flaw in this line of thought, namely 
the likelihood of encountering new events that could altogether defy existing knowledge. The model 
suggests that in high novel situations where recognizing patterns might prove quite difficult, 
experienced officers will have to rely on their metacognitive skills. In such circumstances officers are 
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better poised to employ a story building strategy — developing useful “stories” from several unrelated 
events to make a workable action plan. The R/M model involves a two-tier process:  
➢ An activation stage where action plans are developed through pattern recognition 
➢ The critiquing and correcting stage where the workability of the outcome from the first stage 
is quickly assessed and deliberately checked for faults.  
 
Three types of faults can be identified in an action plan through critiquing (i) incompleteness ── 
information required to formulate the action plan is missing (ii) unreliability ― information required 
to support potential actions or goals is subject to erroneous interpretations (iii) conflict ― a lack of 
alignment between available data and actor’s mental model. The correcting stage immediately follows 
the critiquing stage; here attempts are made to fix the gaps identified in the proposed action plans. 
This could entail making further observation, generating additional information, revising current 
assumptions, or all of the above.  
 
Intuitive versus Analytical decision making: two sides of the same coin? 
It is well known that experts are likely to approach problems using both intuition and analysis, 
switching between both styles as conditions warrant (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Evans and Over, 
2010; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) ── but the sequence of operation these should follow has 
remained rather unclear. Do experts draw on intuition and analysis as separate ‘inputs’ when making 
critical decisions or do they firstly make intuitive decisions and analyse a bit more afterwards? One 
important observation from our research on expert cognition is that the debate regarding the 
preferred thinking mode continues to point to an inherent difficulty, at least in practice, of separating 
intuition from analysis. Dörfler and Ackermann (2012) used the analogy of the functioning of the 
human eyes to exemplify how intuitive and analytical systems generally tend to operate. As with 
peripheral vision, the intuitive mode ensures that operators have good awareness of their surrounding 
environment, implying that other informational cues in the environment could be tracked alongside 
performing a main task. In contrast, the analytical mode, similar to the foveal functioning of the eyes 
is designed to focus on one element at a time i.e. the particular element the decision maker is 
conscious of. Arguably, this lack of flexibility explains why the analytical mode is generally seen as a 
less viable option in a crisis environment that is characterised by high stakes, constantly changing 
conditions and time pressure.   
Although intuition operates in the sub-conscious, it does not necessarily contradict analyses, nor is it 
the opposite of analyses. This assertion is evident in the words of Simon (1987, p.63):  
“intuition is analyses frozen into habit and into the capacity for rapid response through 
recognition”. 
 Simon viewed intuition and analyses as dual mental processes distinguished notably by their speed 
of operation and ease of application. Prior evidence also gives credence to the notion of intuition and 
analysis being complementary rather than competitive (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005; Gore and 
Conway, 2016). For example, in his book entitled “Thought and choice in chess” de Groot (1965) 
reported how grand masters used their intuition to recognize some promising moves that required 
close examination, allowing them switch to a more analytical mode as conditions warrant. This 
transition from intuitive to analytical mode gave the chess players a little extra time to reflect on their 
moves as the game progressed. Through a process known as mental simulation, the chess players 
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were then able to analyse their game-plan such that moves perceived to be less rewarding were 
screened out, leaving a single move that was considered playable. As with the chess study, many NDM 
scholars have favoured an intuition-driven approach to decision making over the analytical style (Klein, 
2015). The logic behind this is that, with intuition being the default thinking mode, actors are able to 
free up extra mental energy which can then be used to perform the more difficult (non-routine) tasks. 
The analytical mode is thus best invoked when the former struggles to solve a problem at hand, or 
when decision makers are obliged to justify their chosen course of action.  
The cognitive continuum theory (Hammond et al., 1987) has also proved of worth in explaining the 
interplay between the intuitive and analytical systems, and how they combine during task 
performance. The theory classifies task characteristics into “analysis-inducing” and “intuition-
inducing” tasks, and suggests that the nature of the task environment (e.g. scale of incident, level of 
risk, available time) will usually determine the dominant decision making strategy. According to the 
theory, deliberating on possible options does not necessarily translate into incompetence, what 
matters is understanding the circumstances that warrant a particular decision style. Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer (2002) used the term adaptive toolbox to explain how people adapt their decision-making 
styles to environmental structures and the degree to which various decision strategies fit into different 
conditions. The adaptive toolbox is thus based on the assumption that no universal tool can possibly 
solve all tasks ― simple and complex ones alike.  
The remainder of this paper is focused on evaluating a cognitive model that was developed from our 
recent study with firefighters, and highlighting its implications for practice. Based on a thematic 
analysis of retrospective incident reports, the model describes how expert participants used intuition, 
or analysis, or a combination of both to arrive at important judgments.  
Information filtering and intuitive decision model  
In a recent study involving thirty experienced firefighters across selected fire stations in the UK (n=15) 
and Nigeria (n=15), we developed a cognitive model that describes how experts made difficult fire 
ground decisions under time pressure (Fig. 1). Detailed description of the study and coding process 
have been discussed elsewhere (see Okoli et al., 2016a; Okoli et al., 2016b), only an evaluation of the 
model is done in this paper. Using the critical decision method as knowledge elicitation tool, the study 
examined how experienced actors made intuitive but largely accurate decisions in conditions of 
moderate to extreme task constraints. The study followed a rigorous thematic analysis protocol, and 
the coding frames generated were cross examined by three investigators to enhance the reliability of 
results. Interview excerpts were first coded and abstracted into sub-categories and then into 
categories, subsequently leading to the emergence of themes and subsequently the IFID model. A 
total of 134 decision points was identified from the incident accounts. We defined a decision point as 
a particular spot on the incident timeline where participants admitted following a course of action 
even when other potential options had been envisaged e.g. employing a hose reel as opposed to a 
main jet.  
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Fig 1: Information filtering and intuitive decision making model  
 
Discussion and implications for practice  
The IFID model is a conceptualization of the way that thirty experienced firefighters managed to deal 
with the complexities generated from managing non-routine incidents through the iterative stages of 
information scanning and information filtering. The first stage of the model is the information 
scanning stage. At this point several questions automatically come to the mind of an officer, who must 
immediately assess the situation and determine what key hazards are in the environment e.g. whether 
people are trapped in the building or whether the response crew have enough resources to manage 
the incident. The officer will also need to consider the safest and most effective way to manage the 
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incident and predict how the external environment is likely to affect task performance. When scanning 
for useful task related information, officers seem to rely on information from both internal and 
external sources as shown in the model. On the internal side, expert operators will scan their memory 
in search of previously stored patterns, with the hope that insights drawn from pre-stored knowledge 
will prove effective in solving a current problem. Pre-stored knowledge could emerge from key 
learning points picked from past training exercises, or from new skills gained from previously managed 
incidents. On the external side, officers rely on information generated from observing the various cues 
associated with a particular incident such as flame intensity, smoke colour, smoke texture, cracked 
walls, or from verbal, physiological or psychological cues observed in victims or passers-by.  
The second stage of the IFID model is the information filtering stage. For the purpose of clarity, we 
define information filtering as the cognitive ability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant 
informational cues. The relevance of the information filtering stage is the possibility that decision 
makers are left with fewer options to choose from as irrelevant cues get filtered out. This generally 
creates additional working memory space to help with performing more difficult tasks, since the extra 
unnecessary information, which Klein (2003) termed noise, tends to add to the complexity of existing 
chaos. Noise comprises irrelevant data or cues that competes with, or even overlaps the relevant ones; 
these intersections eventually add to existing complications as more possible ways of interpreting a 
problem start to emerge. The caveat here, however, is understanding that the term ‘irrelevant’ does 
not necessarily mean ‘useless’, irrelevant here simply represent information that do not fit the 
purpose of a current task. Extra care must therefore be taken to ensure that important informational 
cues are not screened out or explained away at this stage.  
As shown in the model, once the information filtering process is deemed complete and all necessary 
information obtained, incident commanders then proceed to the third stage ── the validation stage. 
The validation process ensures that all missing gaps in current data are identified and that all potential 
sources of post-decision regrets are envisaged. Overall, the decision to validate, including the length 
and depth of the validation process is often influenced by certain factors such as the level of stakes 
involved, available time, team composition and ease of information retrieval. The process usually 
takes one of two major forms: (i) mental simulation ― the commander uses their experience to project 
the status of the current environment into the future, allowing potential cognitive pitfalls as well as 
opportunities in a potential action plan to be pre-empted (ii) quick consultation with peers ― this 
occurs when a commander perceives the need to ‘pick the brain’ of other team members prior to 
implementing an action plan. In conditions of high uncertainty or conflicting goals, some officers feel 
more confident when they run their proposed action plans through other experienced crew members. 
We termed these two validation processes ‘intuition guided by analysis’, a term that serves to caution 
managers on the need to regulate their natural tendencies to intuit, particularly in high-staked and 
extremely uncertain task conditions. It is also pertinent to clarify that the term ‘intuition guided by 
analysis’ is conceptually different from the extreme analytical thinking mode, but similar to what 
Hogarth (2003) termed imposing ‘circuit breakers’ or what Cohen et al (1996) described as conducting 
a ‘quick test’.  
According to the IFID model, the implementation of proposed action plans begins once officers are 
satisfied with the outcome of the validation process i.e. when there is no perceived need to validate 
further. One of the cues that triggers this decision is that officers begin to experience a significant level 
of congruity between their mental model and the way events are proceeding at each decision point. 
More so, all sources of information must have been duly checked for clarity and reliability before 
officers generally begin to experience what Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) termed ‘a sense of 
confidence that precedes intuitive judgement’.  
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In contrast to some cognitive models that largely attribute expert intuition to actors’ ability to 
recognise previously stored patterns in memory (e.g. RPD model, Klein, 2008) or in models where 
expert intuition has been linked to actors’ metacognitive ability to spot gaps in action plans (e.g. R/M 
model, Cohen et al., 1996), the IFID model, in addition to these, purports that intuitive decision making 
is strongly hinged on being able to process multiple informational cues efficiently. Building on the “less 
is more” principle (Hertwig and Todd 2003) and the cognitive load theory (Paas et al. 2004), the model 
links intuitive decision making to experts’ efficient information processing ability, which allows 
irrelevant cues to be sifted out and the relevant ones retained. Regardless of the proceeding of events 
in an external environment, officers must ensure their working memory, which by definition is only 
able to process between 7-9 elements at any given time, is not overloaded (Paas et al., 2004). Within 
this context, one would argue that whilst having very little information about an incident could prove 
less productive, absorbing too much information could also be counter-productive and ultimately 
result in cognitive overload. The need to effectively manage both the amount and quality of 
information absorbed by officers across an incident timeline is therefore key to effective response.   
Another contribution of the IFID model lies in its attempt to clarify the role of intuition in analytical 
thinking. Whist we agree that intuitive and deliberative modes, although conceptually different, often 
complement each other ― at least in practice ― we also wish to acknowledge that the decision to 
deliberate on a course of action is an intuitive function in the first place. According to the IFID model, 
intuition is perceived as a precursor to analytical thinking and essentially indicates where the analytical 
effort should focus. The model thus embodies our observation that intuition will often precede the so 
called analytical thinking in almost all cases i.e. actors would first run a ‘quick test’ based on available 
evidence to determine whether to act instantaneously (based on recognised patterns) or to deliberate 
a little further. Thus, the IFID model does not just give credence to the synergy that exist between the 
intuitive and analytical modes, it further demonstrates how decision makers are often provided with 
a quick opportunity to assess their expertise and gauge the boundaries of their skills prior to 
implementing any proposed action plan (see earlier discussion on the validation stage). Asking where 
and how one is likely to be betrayed by intuition and whether further deliberation might prove more 
appropriate is an important step to preventing post-decision regrets.    
Having said this, it would be somewhat misleading to ignore the conception that intuitive skills are 
often difficult to acquire in practice. The good news, however, is that the process of gaining them can 
be propelled through training and deliberate practice (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Okoli, Weller and 
Watt, 2014). If intuition is understood as “pattern recognition based on experience and learning that 
is especially useful in complex situations that require instantaneous actions or behaviours” (Redekop 
2009, p.400), then training novices or ‘pseudo-experts’ to become better intuitive decision makers will 
mostly entail strengthening their experience base through relevant learning tasks. Modelling what 
experts do as described in the IFID model and teaching such to novices is thus envisaged as a useful 
framework for such training purposes. Frankly speaking, developing a reservoir of experiential 
knowledge takes several years of dedication and hard work. For example, the study of Chase and 
Simon (1973) showed that at least 10,000 hours of dedicated practice is required to attain the highest 
level of performance in chess ― this is equivalent to playing chess five hours daily for at least six years. 
Tellingly, the more patterns people acquire over their years of active practice the more likely they are 
able to match a new situation to one of pre-stored patterns. The model offers insight into improved 
methods of designing curricula that will enable novices to focus more effectively on the key elements 
of the situations they study and participate in. 
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Conclusion and future research 
Overall, this paper has revisited a long standing debate regarding the dominance and sequence of 
operation between the intuitive and analytical modes. In doing so, the paper reviewed prior beliefs 
attributing analytical thinking to purely objective and rational constructs, and discussed why such 
theory generally appears unrealistic in a crisis environment. Our own investigation revealed that 
experienced crisis managers usually employ the intuitive mode as their default strategy, but also draw 
on intuition and analysis as separate inputs as conditions warrant. When confronted with choice 
dilemmas, experienced commanders utilise their extensive experiential knowledge to determine the 
most plausible option through a ‘quick test’.  
Future work could attempt to test and validate the assumptions of the IFID model across other 
domains of practice such as military, ambulance services and intensive care units. It will be useful for 
researchers and practitioners within the decision-making community to continue to develop effective 
training or learning tasks for novices that focus on developing certain aspects of their expertise (e.g. 
situation awareness). Further studies could then explore how novices might be supported to become 
more reliant on, and more confident in their intuitive judgments, particularly in conditions of 
considerable time pressure and high stakes. Hopefully, the insights presented in this paper provide a 
useful starting point to drive research in this direction. Regardless of how intuition is perceived, the 
fact remains that a paradigm shift is needed in the field of crisis management if operational 
commanders are to become fast thinkers.     
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